I'm not glad you're struggling with things at work and I'm not glad that you have to do things to keep your mind busy because I know that feeling much too well but I am glad it results in this.



(giggle)

I see the Madhyamaka school's understanding of dependent origination as a non-causal understanding of the world. Do you see it as not non-causal or just as invalid? (It's the reason I asked the Owlish question, I think it might be fair to say that only a being able to think causally could come up with it).

The cobra 2 is a criminal organisation...Oh Bugger! No, that's the 39 steps. I dunno.

I'd probably borrow Ludwig W's remark about the solipsist and twist it slightly: what they want to say is correct, only it cannot be said. I might not though. It's ever so slightly arrogant to make glib summations of an entire philosophy, when you don't really know much about it. Bad taste at the very least.

It isn't the approach to understanding causation I would take. They are clearly correct in that all the possible causes and sets of circumstances in creation cannot be determined and hence, this sort of investigation cannot lead to an ultimate truth. But then, I wonder whether the emphasis on the lack of independent reality of phenomena and the emphasis on "dependent origination" is actually a way of setting a frame of mind; like the ladder that you have to climb to get somewhere, but which you then dispose of.

I'm not sure that it's a non-causal view. I think it might be putting causation into a proper place or perspective, by emphasising that it can have no ultimate (as in enlightening) explanatory power. There's a tendency in western thought to assume that science can explain everything. This is very much like, if not completely synonymous with the thought that if only we knew all the causes, then we would know all the answers. So in this sense, relegating cause to it's proper place, is a useful exercise.

I don't think I know  Madhyamaka writing well enough to say much more without making crass mistakes. It's years since I read any Bhuddist stuff anyway. I don't really know whether they're getting at a Zeno-like notion that all existence, time, movement etc. are illusions, or whether they're saying something more like a sort of Platonic view of forms. Or something different altogether.

What do you think?

I think I agree with you mostly.

I agree that it's mainly about setting a frame of mind. But then I think the causal way of thinking is, too, for other purposes.

I absolutely agree with what you said about the view of science in western culture. I think that's a big problem.

I think Madhyamaka are definitely saying all that shiz is an illusion but I don't think they're saying it in a Zen way. It smacks more of Taoism (to which, along with Ludy W. I am very sympathetic) to me.

I'm sorry, I haven't really said much. Nothing useful is coming to mind right now.

I think that having a non-causal "understanding" would be the equivalent of insanity.