What names are these?
I don't see none. And it weren't me, I ain't done nothing.
I see that Matt is calling himself 'some owls' though. What a fucking stupid name.
I agree that we can't explain it as a component of the world but disagree that we can't imagine a world without it (but it depends what you mean by 'world'?).
First bit - not sure what you're comparing (between the necessity of causation and the force of valid logic) so I may have misunderstood. But isn't any similarity there due to them being the same thing? (I mean, the language of causation is a logical one).
Or do you mean by 'force' that they have a feeling of truth to them (in that they match up with what we see/experience)? If so I think it's difficult to separate what we experience and the language we frame it in and also (saying the same thing again really) that that force is the same thing as that proposition being (in whatever terms the language sets down) a valid one.
(Do artistic/musical/theological propositions have that same force?)
I'm kinda lost now, I've forgotten what if anything was in dispute or I didn't understand.
I agree with what you've said (except for being able to imagine a non-causal world) but/and none of that goes towards suggesting that causation is not/is other to (only) conventional, right?
hmm, not sure. Are you saying that even were I to arrive at a non-causal understanding of the world I could only get there through having a causal understanding in the first place?
But none of that speaks to whether it's 'true' or 'real' or anything, just that it's useful, as it undeniably is (as is our perception of time as linear, which is a pretty closely related thing).
Something being useful doesn't debar something contrary to it also being useful (or from existing). We think of the world as flat and lots of our activities rely on us thinking it is so but that doesn't mean that it's not sometimes useful to think of the world as round or that thinking of the world as round prevents those flat-world activities and none of that has a bearing on which if either are true.